India’s judiciary, especially the Supreme Court of India, has traditionally been viewed as the guardian of constitutional morality and defender of fundamental rights. Judicial activism — a broadly applicable term denoting a proactive stance by courts to resist macro social, economic or political evils, often through an expansive reading of both the Constitution and laws — has emerged as one of the most consequential such ideas in the realm of judiciary. The rise of judicial activism in India which hailed as a tool of justice and empowerment but has also been seen as a threat to separation of powers and a lack of democratic accountability.

Judicial activism, which took off during the late 1970s and 1980s, particularly through the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) movement. In pathbreaking judgments such as Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) and S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), the Court relaxed the rules of locus standi, enabling any public-spirited citizen to file petitions on behalf of the underprivileged. This was a radical departure from the usual adversarial litigation, and it demonstrated the judiciary’s dedication to substantive justice rather than procedural formalism.

This trend was further entrenched in the 1990s and 2000s via daring decisions, like in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), where the Court proceeded to frame guidelines to deal with sexual harassment at the workplace as no legislation had been promulgated. Likewise, in this context in Vineet Narain v. Union of India Propper Agency (1998), directives were given by the supreme court to ensure implementation of transparency in the functioning of investigative agencies. These cases illustrate the Court’s readiness to fill legislative and executive{{ji}} gaps — particularly when flash hostitarians{{ji}} rights are involved.

Critics, however, contend that judicial activism threatens to turn the courts into an unelected super-legislature. The Constitution of India envisaged a clear distinction between the legislature, which is tasked with law-making, and the executive, which is assigned the responsibility of implementing the policy. An overly significant role for judges in these areas risks not only disturbing the balance of institutions but also threatening their democratic legitimacy. The term “judicial overreach” is frequently invoked to describe situations in which courts are seen to be exceeding their constitutional mandate.

This tension played out in cases such as Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (2015) in which, by declaring National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) unconstitutional, the Court re-emphasised judicial primacy in appointments — a judgment praised for protecting independence but which also attracted censure for resisting accountability. The dividing line between activism and restraint is a thin one, and the judiciary must tread it carefully.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, judicial activism has been instrumental in shaping Indian constitutionalism. It has dealt with environmental issues (MC Mehta v. Union of India), facilitated enforcement of socio-economic rights (People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India) and advocated electoral transparency (Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms). Judiciary intervention has often been the only route to timely justice in a country faced with systemic inefficiencies that result in the Executive and Legislative arms of government sometimes being slow to right a wrong.

Academically, judicial activism is not treated as a dictionary definition concept, but as a matter of degree. At one end is what we might think of as “judicial engagement” — an approach in which courts read laws through a lens of constitutional values. On the other hand is “judicial legislation” — courts that create new norms when they lack statutory authority. Neither works yet one must avoid constitutional imbalance where executive has a free run, yet promises of justice surfaced in the experience of India cannot be ignored; greater challenge remains to strike a principled balance which respects constitutional roles and delivers on justice.

It could, however, be concluded that judicial activism in India is reflection of changing role of the judiciary in democratic milieu. It is a reminder that courts are not simply interpreters of law but guardians of rights and values. But judicial discretion should be exercised with constitutional restraint and institutional humility. Only then can activism serve as an instrument of empowerment and not a force of imbalance.

References

1. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360

2. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011

3. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889

4. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1

5. Sathe, S.P., Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (Oxford University Press, 2003)